# 1nc

### 1nc cp

#### Text: the United States federal government should add every country to the list of countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. The United States federal government should cease current and ban future projects of regime change, economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, isolation of disapproved political movements, and counterterrorism operations to countries governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.

#### Counterplan solves – the aff takes Cuba off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the counterplan adds every country to the list of state sponsors of terrorism but says being on the list of state sponsors of terrorism prevents the US from being able to militarily or coercively intervene in that country’s affairs. Your author concludes the only reason the list is problematic is it allows neoconservative approaches towards those countries, but we solve that better

**Jackson 7 -** Professor in International Politics at Aberystwyth University (Richard, “Critical reflection on counter-sanctuary discourse”, In: M. Innes, ed. Denial of sanctuary: understanding terrorist safe havens, p. 30-33) //RGP

A related problem for the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has always been characterized by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during the Cold War demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries as "state sponsors" of "international terrorism," but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa—despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. The "terrorist sanctuaries" literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like the Afghan Mujahaddin. anti-Castro groups, and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism, including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners.51 Many would argue that from this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse has functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West's direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of anticommunist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the United States, and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period; U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the Cold War 53; U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the United States54: U.S. support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia. and Iran 55; British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Irelands 56 and various other "Islamist" groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others57; Spanish state terror during the "dirty war" against ETA58; French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars59—among many other examples. In short. there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely,' called terrorists. despite overwhelming evidence of their use of terror and intimidation against civilians. This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islam iya group is typically described as a terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians arc exempted from the terrorist label.61 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism," but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,62 former Latin American state terrorists63 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups64 is completely ignored. Most glaringly, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Indonesia—and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.65—is hardly ever discussed in the mainstream "terrorist sanctuaries" literature. From a discourse analytic perspective, it can further be argued that the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse often functions to promote a set of partisan political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," including: all failed, weak, or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism: a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the Internet; diasporas in Western countries; groups and regions characterized by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organizations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and "extremist" ideologies—among others. The identification of these groups and domains as "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens" then functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them—all in the name of counterterrorism. The point is that there may be other political reasons for taking action against such groups which the "terrorist sanctuary" label obscures. From this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse can be shown to support a range of discrete political projects and interests, including: limiting expressions of dissent; controlling the media; centralizing executive power; creating a surveillance society; expanding state regulation of social life; retargeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counterinsurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order66; de-legitimizing all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change**,67** economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In short, the discourse functions—in its present form—to permit the extension of Western state hegemony both internationally and domestically. I Ineffectual Policies A final criticism of the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counterproductive. In particular. the policy of employing military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and targeted assassination against "terrorist sanctuaries" in the Palestinian territories and surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the 1980s. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the use of force in the current War on Terror against Afghanistan and Iraq, have also failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka. the Philippines, Turkey, and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of antistate terrorist violence. It could be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate "terrorist sanctuaries" in Afghanistan. Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have in fact, had the opposite effect. In many respects, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and "terrorist" groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience and greatly in creased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region." It is probable that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing international terrorist campaign against U.S. interests and its allies. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying drivers and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative one. From this viewpoint, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place. CONCLUSION There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and critical of the language they employ and the "knowledge" they produce, because discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the "terrorism sanctuaries" discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a particular international order which is beneficial to a few, but violent and unjust to many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused by current Western counterterrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 40,000 civilians69 and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11. 2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.

### 1nc k

#### The affirmative’s concept of violence as external from their own lives allows individuals to abdicate their responsibility. Denial of our individual culpability with violence forecloses the possibility of meaningful change; in the process, violence becomes more likely.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 1-4]

What is striking is that the **violence** which is talked about **is always** the violence **committed by someone else**: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people; the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the `street', and all together about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence is recognized and measured by its visible effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction of objects, the visible damage left in the world of `objects'. In its measurable damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence - the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the violation of human dignity - are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence. Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective - an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action - not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, **ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act**, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its circumstances. (Compare the question, `Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, `What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search - on the part of the tabloid press or professionals of violence - for experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in scientific model of a `cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, e a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, **yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it.** Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not `cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice. To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.' This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups - the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) - and an implied `centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and careers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of implying that the `solution' lies in a change to circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo-Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the Anti. Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that `the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should be tackled and that it is `problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.' Besides being no explanation at all of why (white poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It not only legitimates the violence (by `explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will be taken seriously when and where `they attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools (mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc., are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including `educative' trips to Morocco and Israel,' this is am unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off'.

#### Political violence is sustained by organized thinking that looks at violence through meta-analysis. We need to have deeper insight that realizes that each of us is culpable for violence. This is integral to ending the cycle of violence and reclaiming agency.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 8-11]

Moreover, personal behaviour is no alternative to `political' action; there is no question of either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider `normal' but which betray our own will to violence - the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to `political issues' or to `personal behaviour', the question of the politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique. Violence - what we usually recognize as such - is no exception to the rules, no deviation from the normal and nothing out of the ordinary, in a society in which exploitation and oppression are the norm, the ordinary and the rule. It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for `harmless' consumption by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is `simply' a specific - and to us still visible - form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and everyday life. War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the `outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. **'We are the war'**, writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, `what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war ... And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen. ' `We are the war' - and we also `are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called `peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. `We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where **the major dramas of power** take place tends to **obscure our sight** in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and **our** own **responsibility** - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `**powerlessness'** and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into **underrating the responsibility** we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to **absolve us** from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that **we cannot `do' anything**, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution.' 7 , We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing `nothing', of its `inaction', of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become `active' again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- their analysis of violence is insufficient and you should punish their failure by politicizing the way we think about violence can we find ways to end the cycle of violence.

**Kappeler in 1995** [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 4-5]

If we nevertheless continue to explain violence by its ‘circumstances’ and attempt to counter it by changing these circumstances, it is also because in this way we stay in command of the problem. In particular, we do not complicate the problem by any suggestions that it might be people who need to change. Instead, we turn the perpetrators of violence into the victims of circumstances, who as victims by definition, cannot act sensibly (but in changed circumstances will behave differently. ‘We,’ on the other hand, are the subjects able to take in hand the task of changing the circumstances. Even if changing the circumstance – combating poverty, unemployment, injustice, etc. – may not be easy, it nevertheless remains within ‘our’ scope at least theoretically and by means of state power. Changing people, on the other hand, is neither within our power nor, it seems, ultimately in our interest: we prefer to keep certain people under control, putting limits on their violent behavior, but we apparently have no interest in a politics that presupposes people's ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behavior. For changing (as opposed to restricting) other people's behavior is beyond the range and in­fluence of our own power; only they themselves can change it. It requires their will to change, their will not to abuse power and not to use violence. A politics aiming at a change in people's behavior would require political work that is very much more cumbersome and very much less promising of success than is the use of state power and social control. It would require political consciousness-raising — politicizing the way we think — which cannot be imposed on others by force or compulsory educational measures. It would require a view of people which takes seriously and reckons with their will, both their will to violence and their will to change. To take seriously the will of others however would mean recognizing one's own, and putting people's will, including our own, at the centre of political reflection. A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favour of violence - not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable them to take place, but also to capture the moment of decision which is the real impetus for violent action. For without this decision there will be no violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the 3decision to violate, not just the act itself, which makes a person a perpetrator of violence - just as it is the decision not to do so which makes people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision, there­fore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence. To understand the structures of thinking and the criteria, by which such decisions are reached, but above all to regard this decision as an act of choice, seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against violence and for a non-violent society.

### 1nc t

#### Interpretation: the aff has to defend their plan text.

#### Prefer this.

#### a) Stasis --- holding them down to a specific advocacy is key to a centered discussion and advocacy

#### b) Ground --- all neg ground is predicated off of a stable affirmative advocacy

### 1nc t

#### Interpretation and violation --- economic engagement requires trade promotion --- the plan is an economic inducement

**Celik, 11** – master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with **trade mechanisms** where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is **highly different** from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

#### C. Voting issue –

#### 1. limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything

#### 2. negative ground – trade promotion is vital for a stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan ground

## epistemology

**Focusing on epistemology selfishly ignores real world problems**

**Jarvis, 2K** – Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 2)

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5

**We don’t try to exclude their epistemological concerns, but they aren’t relevant to international relations**

**Jarvis, 2K** – Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 14)

This, perhaps, is what makes the study and theory of international relations fuzzy, or what Nicholas Rengger described as international relations' "irreducible fluidity and contextuality, the sense that its centre is everywhere and its circumference nowhere."48 Imposing rigid boundaries upon so nebulous an exercise as normative discussion of future worlds or of critical reflections upon present ones (the "ought" of international theory) is obviously an inappropriate response, reminding us that those who attempt closure commit "a massive violation of Aristotle's injunction not to try to treat a subject with a degree of exactness it will not admit of."49 The normative/moral/critical aspects of international theory must necessarily be allowed freedom to roam the corridors of idealism and critical reflection, thinking about how we think and writing about how we write. But this is not an invitation to stray from the purpose of this enterprise, an attempt to think critically about how we understand, and how, through understanding, we might realize better worlds. Normative theory too has a certain circumference, an outer limit beyond which its concerns cease to be those of International Relations. To admit as much is not to "marginalize" certain approaches as postmodernists accuse, but to recognize that some issues begin to fall outside the purview of our discipline.

## ethics

#### Do not evaluate their value system without first assessing the consequences of its actual implementation. Viewing ethics in isolation is irresponsible & complicit with the evil they criticize.

**Issac 02**.,( Jeffery C. Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington & Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life. PhD Yale University. From “Ends, Means, and Politics.” Dissent Magazine. Volume 49. Issue # 2. Available online @ subscribing institutions using Proquest. Herm

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacyand international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they arealsovague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand.In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goalsand to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Rejecting consequences undermines responsibility, freedom and politics

**Williams, 2005-** Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales (Michael, “the realist tradition and the limits of international relations”, p 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in international relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. Inthe wilful realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of self-critical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for self-reflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 but it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

#### Our ethical obligation to secure justice demands calculative thought—the alternative is the continuation of violence and oppression

**Campbell 99** (David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 46-7)

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, "that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others."9' Indeed, "incalculable justice requires us to calculate." From where does this insistence come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that "left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation."92 The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty, a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid "the bad," the "perverse calculation," even "the worst." This is the duty that also dwells with deconstruction and makes it the starting point, the "at least necessary condition," for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences "we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the **crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism**." Furthermore, the duty within the decision, the obligation that recognizes the necessity of negotiating the possibilities provided by the impossibilities of justice, is not content with simply avoiding, containing, combating, or negating the worst violence-though it could certainly begin with those strategies. Instead, this responsibility, which is the responsibility of responsibility, commissions a "utopian" strategy. Not a strategy that is beyond all bounds of possibility so as to be considered "unrealistic," but one which in respecting the necessity of calculation, takes the possibility summoned by the calculation as far as possible, "must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on."94 As Derrida declares, "The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention."95 This leads Derrida to enunciate a proposition that many, not the least of whom are his Habermasian critics, could hardly have expected: "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities." 6

#### Calculative thought is necessary in order to secure justice in the face of specific forms of oppression that deny “being” or “alterity”

**Campbell 99** (David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 50-51)

In pursuing Derrida on the question of the decision, a pursuit that ends up in the supplementing of Derridean deconstruction with Levinasian ethics, Critchley was concerned to ground political decisions in something other than the "madness" of a decision, and worried that there could be a "refusal of politics in Derrida's work" because the emphasis upon undecidability as the condition of responsibility contained an implicit rejection of politics as "the field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle," the "domain of questioning s Yet from the above discussion, I would argue that Derrida's account of the procedure of the decision also contains within it an account of the duty, obligation, and responsibility of the decision within deconstruction. Moreover, the undecidable and infinite character of justice that fosters that duty is precisely what guarantees that the domain of politics bears the characteristics of contestation rightly prized by Critchley. Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then (as Derrida constantly reminds us) there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible application. Of course, for many (though Critchley is clearly not among them), the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. Butif we seek to encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the other, then the provocations give rise to a different figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is the **struggle for-or on behalf of-alterity**, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity. Such a principle -one that is ethically transcendent if not classically universal-is a **powerful startingpoint** for rethinking, for example, the question of responsibility vis-avis "ethnic" and "nationalist" conflicts.'°6 But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley is not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a progressive, radical politics, one that will demand-and thus do more than simply permit-the decision to resist domination, exploitation, oppression, and all other conditions that **seek to contain or eliminate alterity**. Yet, again, I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its politics a particular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule out forever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisfaction, then, is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended.

# 2nc

### overview

#### The first card in the 1ac is tagged as “the United States labels Cuba as a state sponsor while ignoring its own culpability in numerous attacks against Cuba.”

The top of the 2ac on the case debate says its all the usfg

#### Their Jackson evidence says

#### “terrorism is constituted by and through the discursive practices which make it a concrete reality for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, ….. ……certain acts and individuals are constructed as "terrorism" and "terrorists", including:¶ · The labelling of certain acts and groups as such by authoritative actors, such as the annual State Department reports”

This is the exact type of externalization that the kappeler evidence indicts

### at: boggs

#### The point is that everything is political --- especially their silence --- why should we pretend we’re congress? Why think that we have to be pragmatic? This turns the whole aff.

Grosfoguel, Professor Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, ‘7 (Ramon, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn” Cultural Studies, Vol 21 Issue 2-3, p 211-223, T&F Online)//JAG

Epistemological Critique The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the ‘modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system’ for the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga & Anzaldua 1983, Collins 1990) as well as thirdworld scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977, Mignolo 2000) reminded us that **we always speak from a particular location in the power structures**. Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and racial hierarchies of the ‘modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system’. As feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called this perspective ‘afro-centric epistemology’ (Collins 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (Dussel 1977) and following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldúa (1987) I will use the term ‘body-politics of knowledge’. This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. **In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis**. The ‘ego-politics of knowledge’ of Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated ‘Ego’. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a **myth about a Truthful universal knowledge** that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks. It is important here to distinguish the ‘epistemic location’ from the ‘social location’. The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consist in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemicaly like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that all knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth. Rene Descartes, the founder of Modern Western Philosophy, inaugurates a new moment in the history of Western thought. He replaces God, as the foundation of knowledge in the Theo-politics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages, with (Western) Man as the foundation of knowledge in European Modern times. All the attributes of God are now extrapolated to (Western) Man. Universal Truth beyond time and space, privilege access to the laws of the Universe, and the capacity to produce scientific knowledge and theory is now placed in the mind of Western Man. The Cartesian ‘ego-cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) is the foundation of modern Western sciences. By producing a dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim non-situated, universal, God-eyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the ‘point zero’ perspective of Eurocentric philosophies (Castro-Gomez 2003). The ‘point zero’ is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view, that is, the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this ‘god-eye view’ that always hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism. Western philosophy privileges ‘ego politics of knowledge’ over the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and the ‘body-politics of knowledge’. Historically, this has allowed Western man (the gendered term is intentionally used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to dismiss non-Western knowledge as particularistic and, thus, unable to achieve universality. This epistemic strategy has been crucial for Western global designs. By hiding the location of the subject of enunciation, European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination was able to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of ‘people without history’, to the twentieth century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’. We went from the sixteenth century ‘rights of people’ (Sepulveda versus de las Casas debate in the school of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century), to the eighteenth century ‘rights of man’ (Enlightment philosophers), and to the late twentieth century ‘human rights’. All of these are part of global designs articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans. However, as Enrique Dussel (1994) has reminded us, the Cartesian ‘ego cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) was preceded by 150 years (since the beginnings of the European colonial expansion in 1492) of the European ‘ego conquistus’ (‘I conquer, therefore I am’). The social, economic, political and historical conditions of possibility for a subject to assume the arrogance of becoming God-like and put himself as the foundation of all Truthful knowledge was the Imperial Being, that is, the subjectivity of those who are at the center of the world because they have already conquered it. What are the decolonial implications of this epistemological critique to our knowledge production and to our concept of world-system?

#### The idea that the only political act is policy is lols --- this is a disad to policy-making and proves that how we come to know things is a prior question to developing policy.

**Smith, ‘97** - Steve Smith, Professor of International Relations at the University of East Anglia, 1997 (“Power and truth; a reply to William Wallace,” Review of International Studies, Volume 23, Issue 04, October, p. 508-509)

My central claim is that Wallace has a **very restricted notion** of politics, such that it seems obvious to him just who are those who ‘have to struggle with the dilemmas of power’. For him the political arena is public and it refers to the formal political process, specifically involving the academic in ‘speaking truth to power’. I think that there are two fundamental problems with this view of politics. First, it is very narrow indeed, referring to the activities of elected politicians and policy-makers. It **ignores** the **massive area of political activity** that is not focused on the electoral and policy-making processes, and the host of ‘political’ activities that do not accord with the formal processes of politics. His is a very official and formal definition of politics, one that would omit a vast array of political activities. For Wallace, ‘political’ means having to do with the formal policy process, thereby **restrict**ing **discussion** of politics to a very small subset of what I would define as political. Therefore, Wallace would see detachment where I see engagement; hiding behind the walls of the monastery where I see deep enquiry into the possibilities of the political; and scholasticism where I see intellectual endeavour. Second, and for me more importantly, his view of politics is narrow because it confines itself to **policy debates** dealing with areas of disagreement between competing [end page 508] party positions. The trouble with this view is of course that it **ignores** the **shared beliefs** of any era, and so **does not enquire** into those things that are not problematic for policy-makers. By focusing on the policy debate, **we restrict ourselves** to the issues of the day, **to the tip of the political iceberg**. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘private’). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the ‘buzz’ that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we ‘know’ things about the international political world. My main claim is that International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism’s commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very political view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to ‘speak truth to power’. For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace’s view of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work enquires into how the current ‘politics’ get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of **a prior series of** (political) **epistemological moves** which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

### 2nc alt

#### Our schema is methodological individualism --- vote negative in recognition of the fact that there is no state --- we already live in anarchy. The affirmatives view of the world is logically bankrupt. Individual action can effectively challenge the politics of statism

Max t. O'connor, phd usc, <http://www.buildfreedom.com/tl/tl07d.shtml> winter 1990 (note- this author now goes by max moore [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/max\_more](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_More))

Two of the fundamental extropian values are responsibility for one's own life and actions, and the determination to do away with constraints on one's rational will.(1) i believe that the institutions of religion and "the state"(2) are antithetical to these values. I took aim at the dominant western religion in the last issue and will be dissecting that entropic force again in future. The purpose of this article is to destroy a powerful barrier which stands in the way of personal responsibility and freedom. Extropians tend towards libertarian politics and a suspicion of the "state." many call themselves anarchists, holding that "states" are inherently coercive and should be replaced with voluntary institutions to protect rights and perform other necessary functions.(3) those who already think of themselves as anarchists are likely to be most sympathetic to my thesis, though the deep anarchy idea goes beyond traditional anarchism, whether of the free market or communalist type. Traditional anarchists want to abolish the "state." in planning their strategies and in doing their thinking about this **they rarely question the existence or fundamental nature of their enemy**. This situation wouldn't be so bad if it wasn't for the fact that their mistaken beliefs often lead them into **counterproductive political strategies**. Thus we observe the ludicrous sight of self-named anarchists joining political parties (usually the libertarian party) in order to hasten the end of the system. The idea seems to be: we can remove it by being absorbed by it!(4) i want to suggest that when we talk of "the state" we are not talking of any entity, either concrete or abstract. I will provide two main arguments for this: one from considerations of methodological individualism, and another that could be called "the argument from fuzziness." "deep anarchy" is the view that results from these thoughts; it **is the idea that we already live in an anarchy**. 2: what is it to exist? In order to keep this article to manageable length i will not attempt to provide a complete ontological theory (a theory of what exists). I will only examine the conditions for the existence of complex objects and organisms. I will ignore issues of the existence of numbers, sets, relations, concepts, consciousness, and so on. I will assume that readers accept that complex entities such as tables and humans exist. What about collections of objects? Is a collection also an object? If we wish to accept as objects all the things we normally accept as objects, then it cannot in general be an objection to the objecthood of a thing that it is composed of parts which are themselves objects or individuals: case 1: an eagle is a thing, an object, even though it is composed of many parts such as limbs, organs, feathers, and so on. These parts can be further broken down into sub-parts such as cells, and further into organelles, molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles (or fields). All objects are reducible to collections of more basic individuals except for the fundamental particles or fields, so we face the alternatives of (a) asserting, contrary to all normal usage, that the only really existing things are the sub-atomic particles, or (b) accepting that being a collection of more basic objects cannot, in itself, be a reason for denying the reality of a thing. I take it that everyone will agree that common usage, and the requirements of sanity and workability require us to take the second option. But is any collection of objects itself necessarily an object? Case 2: imagine that i have a bag of marbles, each of which we grant is an object. I scatter the marbles on the floor randomly. Now it is quite possible for me to refer to the collection of marbles as a whole rather than to each of the individual marbles. If i'm eccentric i might even give the collection a name such as "gertrude." by using the name gertrude i can then simply refer to the collection of marbles without having to point to or mention any of the marbles individually. Does this mean that we should say gertrude exists, or that gertrude is an individual, an object? This is far less plausible than in the case of an eagle. Consider case 3: on my desk i have a computer, a glass, a business card, and a sheet of paper with a note scribbled on it. I can now talk about the collection of objects on my desk. The collection is picked out simply by my listing the objects that constitute the collection. Again, if i'm eccentric i might name the collection "jeremiah." should we say that jeremiah is an individual, an object? If we answer in the affirmative we should also say that jeremiah exists. Surely jeremiah does not exist. There is no object here; there is only a mere collection of objects. By pointing to the objects in turn and then telling you that i'm going to refer to the collection as "jeremiah" i am just giving the impression of unity and objecthood where there is none. The "components" of jeremiah are not linked or causally related to each other in any way except one - my arbitrary act of calling them an individual with the name "jeremiah." i might just as easily have given the name "jeremiah" to the conjunction of the glass and computer only. There is nothing special about the group of four objects which i actually named jeremiah. If a human act of naming random collections were enough to constitute an object then the number of objects in the universe would be arbitrary, indeterminate and limitless. Why is the first case clearly one of a collection constituting a higher-level object (or meta-object) whereas the second and third cases are examples of collections which we would not say constitute a meta-object? The answer to this will determine what we should say about "states." my suggestion is this: functional integrity thesis: in the case of the existence of objects, what determines whether a collection of objects is itself an object is the degree of functional integrity possessed by the collection. Secondary thesis: (a) for each (kind of) object, there is a lower limit of functional integrity below which a collection will not constitute an object. (b) where that limit is will vary depending on the kind of object under consideration. An object exists when its parts possess a sufficient degree of functional integrity. Alternatively, we can say that an object exists when it possesses the requisite properties of an object of that type. This is equivalent to the previous definition: properties will only exist where there is a sufficient degree of functional integrity. The existence of an object can therefore be thought of as requiring a second-order functional integrity - sufficient functional integrity of properties (or parts), each of which must have a sufficient degree of integrity. The three examples given above, and many others that could be given, are a major motivating factor behind the functional integrity thesis. The collection of objects on my desk is a mere collection. Nothing makes them into a collection or set apart from the bare fact of my having arbitrarily put them into a group. The collection or group has no existence apart from my specification. My referring to the separate objects by means of a name is not sufficient (or necessary) to make them into a genuine object. **Collections formed by fiat are not thereby objects**. Such collections are not things; we can rightly say that such collections do not exist. By saying this we are not denying that, in the situation at hand, there is something more than the four objects; there is also an act of grouping or of collective reference, but that is all. This act cannot constitute a new object.5 i might point in the direction of the eagle and list the eagle's parts: it's wings, lungs, eyes, liver, etc. I then assert that the collection of parts constitutes an object, a thing. That object is an eagle. Now, though, the individuality of the eagle is not constituted by my act of referring collectively to the group of the eagle-parts. The eagle exists independently of my acts of grouping and referring. There is an objective grouping of parts such that there is a higher-level object in existence. The functional integrity thesis claims that what makes the difference, what gives the collection of eagle-parts an independent existence, is the functional integrity of the collection. There are various very specific and specifiable causal interrelations between the parts. The internal parts of the organism are causally related in a more intimate and systematic manner than the relation of the parts to the environment. There is no rigid separation of organism from environment since air, food and drink are incorporated into the body from the surroundings. Yet the organism is clearly distinguished from its environment by the tightness of its internal organization and by the causal history of its constituent parts. For the eagle to exist the organs must function in a coordinated manner and the skeletal and muscular systems must be appropriately linked up with the rest of the assembly. If the eagle gets torn into pieces we say that the eagle no longer exists. Only its parts continue to exist. The first part of the secondary thesis requires more comment than i have space for, but a brief explanation must suffice. It might be thought that objects exist more-or-less, that there is no way of saying when an object is sufficiently integrated to exist. The idea would be that functional integrity is a matter of degree and so we should hold existence to be graded into degrees. Certainly functional integrity is a matter of degree, and there will be borderline cases where, even given all the facts, we will have to decide what to say. However, the existence of borderline cases does not show thatthere are no clear cases of existence and nonexistence. The fact of twilight does not mean there is no night or day.(6) higher level properties and objects may not arise at an instantaneous point, but conceptual clarity and communication will mean that the extension of a concept is limited. Cognitive systems such as the human brain are well built to handle fuzzy boundaries while being able to categorize the world usefully.(7) the second part of the secondary thesis contends that the minimum degree of functional integrity necessary for a collection to constitute an object depends on the kind of object at issue. Living organisms tolerate less loss of functional integrity before they cease to exist than some other objects. Objects like clouds and oceans can exist with a rather low degree of integrity. Unlike living creatures (or works of art, or even buildings), oceans and clouds don't require any very specific arrangement of their constituent parts; a loose conglomeration will suffice. Some limits do have to be imposed however. If the parts of a cloud are too separated they no longer form a cloud, though they may form more than one cloud. For me to be a human, rather than a collection of flesh or a dead body, very many conditions of bodily integrity must be satisfied. My organs must be in the right place, connected up properly, and their parts must be precisely arranged. Integrity is required right down to the level of the cells and their molecular components, otherwise i am not a living human. In deciding on the degree to which something exists, then, we must take account of the kind of thing that it is. Things of the same kind require the same degree of functional integrity of their parts. 3: argument from fuzziness i am now ready to apply these general ontological theses to the case of "the state." applying the functional integrity thesis (fit) to perceivable physical objects such as tables, chairs, condoms and cars, is a simple enough matter. Even in those cases we have to take care to identify exactly the kind of object we are looking for, in order that we can correctly determine the degree of integrity needed for a collection to constitute that object. Unfortunately, applying the fit to objects of a different order is more difficult. Some purported objects that we need to consider are "states," corporations, clubs, and societies. Where is "the state" to be found? I've never seen one and i don't think anyone else has either. What i do find is a large number of **people** who **claim to be "politicians**," "policemen," "tax collectors," "federal agents," "judges," "government workers," and so on. I also come across buildings and collections of individual human beings which i am told are "the department of..., " "congress," "the white house," "the supreme court," "the irs," etc. Amongst all these people, buildings, guns, pieces of paper, and assorted equipment i cannot find a "state." of course "the state" is supposed to be the collection of these things. But now i have two problems: first, exactly which people and things are to be included in the collection that supposedly constitutes a "state?" second, how can a "state" act, have responsibility, or authority, if it is a collection whose parts (persons) themselves have these qualities? The second of these problems will be discussed in the section "the argument from methodological individualism." if the "state" is to exist, if it is to be a thing, it must be (a) a clearly identifiable collection of parts, and (b) a collection which exhibits a high enough degree of functional integrity. Neither of these conditions are fulfilled. Max weber offers the most helpful definition of a "state." essentially this comes down to saying that a "state" is a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a geographical area. Each element of this definition is necessary. If no force were involved then "it" would be merely a voluntary organization. "governments" or "states" have to use force or coercion in order to finance themselves - the system of taxation-extortion common to all governments. Even more essential is the idea of a monopoly, since someone could argue that it is at least conceivable that a "government" be financed entirely by voluntary contributions, even if this has never happened (and almost certainly never would happen). Yet, if the "state" is not a monopoly then it just cannot be a "state." the deepest and most **essential function** of such an institution is that it decides what laws there are and enforces them. No one else has the right to do this, except and to the degree that the "state" grants this right (a right which it retains the power and authority to remove). The idea of legitimacy comes in here; only "the state" may rightfully make decisions about laws and allowable coercion.(8) furthermore, i ask: who or what is supposed to hold the monopoly of power? I suggest that this is simply a myth. As will be argued in the next section, **the wielders of power** and coercion **are individual human beings**. Each person makes his or her own choices about the use of coercion. We observe no organism, person, or creature with a monopoly on the use of force, legitimate or otherwise. The illusion to the contrary is made possible simply because many people who coerce others **wear uniforms, carry badges, or otherwise claim to "represent" "the state**." the wearing of uniforms, the carrying of badges, and the claims of some people that they are part of "the state" **does nothing to show that there is such a thing**. To clarify the issue, before finishing with "states," let us consider other collections of persons. Do corporations exist? Does a club exist? The answer depends on how the question is to be taken. If it means "is there literally a creature which thinks, acts, plans, and makes agreements?" then the answer is no (see next section). If the question is merely "does the collection of persons involved possess a high enough degree of functional integrity to constitute a thing?" then i believe the answer is plausibly in the affirmative. There are corporations, although they are not things that literally plan, act, or think - though we may treat them as if they have these powers, considering this to be a useful fiction. What gives a corporation its functional integrity? A corporation exists where there is a fairly tight set of relations between persons, each of whom has the capacity to reason, plan, decide and contract. A corporation is essentially a set of agreements between persons; these are agreements to perform certain duties and functions, to accept certain responsibilities, and to receive certain benefits under specified conditions. It is quite definite and determinate who is and who is not part of a corporation. A customer is not a part since he or she does not have the necessary kind of relation to the other people. The corporation is limited in various ways. When a person who is part of the structure of the company steals, rapes, or does anything outside of the functions and activities agreed to in joining the corporation, she is not acting as part of the company. She is individually entirely responsible for the effects of her actions. If, on the contrary, her actions are in accordance with the structure of agreements which constitutes the company, other people may (depending on their contractual agreements) share in responsibility.(9) there is no similar means of determining who the people are who are to constitute a "state." the reason is that there is no set of contractual relations to be found at the level of a "state." this is because of the coercive nature of statism binding contractual relations are not possible while under threat. It would be more promising to argue for the existence (but not the legitimacy) of groups like the los angeles police, the chicago police, the internal revenue service, and the house of representatives. Within each of these bodies more specific functions can be identified and there are definite agreements between the people involved. Putting all of these bodies together does not create a "state." where is the functional integrity necessary to the existence of a further thing? People who go to voting booths and pull levers or make marks on paper next to the name of a politician also have certain relations to those men and women sitting in congress, and relations (at a far remove) to "the police," and yet no one claims that voters are part of "the state" or are really also policemen. So the fact that we can find some relation between those people who might be thought to form "the state" is not enough to show that there is such a thing. True, there is more of a connection between members of "congress" and tax-extortion collectors than there is between the four items i arbitrarily picked out on my desk. However, there is insufficient coordination between the various agencies mentioned to form a higher level agency. They generally have no specific contractual linkage - the only linkage is externally imposed by "law." i have many interactions and relations with my friends, yet there is no thing composed of myself and a friend. In the same way, these agencies can have many links without constituting anything. They do have something in common - **statist behavior**. But the statist behavior of the individuals in any of these agencies does not differ in kind from that of other individuals who are not thought of as part of "the state." this leads into a related argument, in the course of which i will develop this point about the spectrum of statism. 4: argument from **methodological individualism** what kind of thing is "the state" supposed to be? It is supposed to be an agent capable of making decisions, having justification, and acting. This is nonsense: only an individual has a mind and can perceive, think, decide, choose values, and act. In this sense no governments (or corporations or nations) exist or act. If groups (such as corporations) pass the functional integrity test and so exist in some sense, they are still merely "metaphorical constructs for describing the similar or concerted actions of individuals."(10) in the case of "the state," since it fails the functional integrity test, there is a more serious failure of reference when we refer to an **action of "the state."** at least when we talk of a corporation's action we manage to refer to certain fairly definite actions of specifiable individuals. "the state" is not only not an ultimate actor or agent, it is not a thing of any kind. Since "the state" is not any kind of thing, we **cannot truly speak about it**. However, we are doing something when we say "the state is pursuing a war on drugs." we are making an **inaccurate and misleading reference** to a wide range of differing behaviors in many individuals. We are saying - at least - that certain persons calling themselves "policemen" (or "soldiers") are initiating physical violence against drug users; other individuals (politicians and bureaucrats) are issuing orders and directing activities; others (judges) are telling the seized persons that they are guilty of a crime; others (prison guards and administrators) are constraining the freedom of the drug users; and many individuals are encouraging these activities by **voting**, paying "taxes" and by **verbal support**. As ludwig von mises noted, "it is the meaning which the acting individuals and all those who are touched by their action attribute to an action, that determines its character... A group of armed men occupies a place. It is the meaning of those concerned which imputes this occupation not to the officers and soldiers on the spot, but to their nation."(11) we understand fully the actions of a group only when we understand the subjective beliefs, decisions, and actions of the individual human beings comprising the group. "the state" is really nothing more than **statist behavior and belief** - and elements of this can be found in almost everyone. I have argued that there is no boundary which can divide off some behavior as constituting "the state" from other behavior. This point can be made more forceful by considering the wide range of statist behavior and thinking found in society (or "society"!). If it were possible to order these instances along a spectrum we might arbitrarily draw a line beyond which we would say the collection of behaviors was "the state." however, apart from the fact that it would be arbitrary (unlike the division of eagle parts from non-eagle parts), there is no single dimension to be ordered into a spectrum. People can be more or less statist at different times and in very different and incomparable ways. Political office holders, who make laws and oversee and coordinate a wide range of statist behaviors, are clearly guilty of statism much of the time, as are the physical enforcers of unjust laws. Obviously they can be more or less statist depending on what they do and say. Bureaucrats who organize and execute statist activities, lowly office workers in the fda, dea, irs, and ins, and those who support their activities are all sources of statism. Business people who gladly **accept and encourage subsidies**, tariffs, and "government" licenses **are not excused from charges of statism simply because they are supposedly not part of "the state**." workers in state-run and monopolized businesses - such as the post office and state schools, are also contributing to statism. Voters are statist because they legitimize the system. The person who uses the power of a "state" agency unjustly against someone (rent control, for example) is being statist. Anyone voting for, verbally supporting, or turning a blind eye to statism is thereby statist. In so far as there is any sense to talk of "the state" then, it is talk of statist behavior. And this is not confined to easily specifiable individuals. We may all be statist at times. Perhaps even the least statist of us sometimes choose statism in order to protect ourselves against worse behavior by others. In a corrupt system, behavior that you would otherwise reject may be the only rational course of action. This is the tragedy of the institutional effects of statism. For example, in a socialist country where everything is owned by "the state" (= everything is run in a statist manner), you may face the choice of working in a statist institution or starving. In this country, if you wish to mail a letter first class, you must choose between the "government" monopoly or nothing. What are you to do?(12) 5: bringing about a better anarchy **we already live in an anarchy. There is no "state." there are only individuals acting in a statist manner,** often because they believe it to be right, to be necessary, and because they see no alternative. Extropians who wish to bring about a more rational social system, a system more capable of allowing diversity, of encouraging rational responsible behavior, and of minimizing conflict, should not join political parties, or try to attack "the state." what is needed is a micro-politics, a politics of individual behavior.(13) we should seek to minimize our own contribution to statism, and to persuade others to do the same. We should withhold all support for statism whenever possible without seriously endangering ourselves. We should avoid paying tax-extortion (the life blood of statism) and should pay no heed to unjust laws whenever we can. We should encourage a cultural change, by rewarding and praising voluntaristic and anti-statist behavior, art, fiction, movies, and role-models and by pointing out what is wrong with their contraries. And in doing this a sense of humor can only help us. Sometimes it is a grim fight, but extropians are dynamic optimists and realize that hard fights against stupidity and coercion are best fought with high ideals conjoined with humor and understanding, not anger, hatred, or violence. Our goal is to increase understanding and increase rationality and responsibility, not to destroy. One of the four central extropian principles(14) is that of self-responsibility for one's values, choices, and thinking. Living up to this principle is the best way to fight statism and to bring about the universal extropian community proper to intelligent beings. A focus on the individual and the rationality of behavior will not only break down statism, but all other forms of collectivist irrationality such as racism, sexism, and nationalism.

### at: spills to us

#### Tying ethical reorientation of ourselves with reorientation of our political spheres produces mediated relationships that make genuine ethical engagement impossible.

**Zupancic 2k,** research – institute of philosophy – ljubljana, 20**00**. [alenka, ethics of the real: kant and lacan, march] p. 10-11

In other words, one **cannot attain** the realm of the ethical by means of a gradual elevation of the will, by pursuing more and more refined, subtle and noble goals, by gradually turning away from one's `base animal instincts'. Instead we find that a sharp break, **a `paradigm shift', is required** to move from the pathological to the ethical. Here we must resist the temptation of the standard image of kantian ethics, according to which this ethics demands a perpetual `purification' (from everything pathological) and an asymptotic approach to the ethical ideal. Even though this image is not without some support in kant's texts, it is nevertheless misleading - first because it invites a considerable simplification of the logic of kant's argument; second because it obscures another very important line of argument, the claim that the aktus der freiheit, the `act of freedom', the genuine ethical act, is always subversive; it is never simply the result of an `improvement' or a `reform'. Thus: if a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man ... , this **cannot be brought about through gradual reformation** so long as the basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition..:. He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were [through] a new creation.5 this passage from religion within the limits of reason alone is especially important for grasping the logic of kantian ethics. Kant's distinction between philosophical ethics and the way in which moral questions are presented in religious doctrines is no doubt familiar. Less well recognized is the fact that he situates the appropriate change of disposition [gesinnung] in a gesture of creation ex nihilo. The impact of this gesture escapes us entirely if we see it as a kind of retreat into the irrational, as a chimera of idealism. It is, on the contrary, a profoundly materialist gesture. As jacques lacan points out on several occasions, it is only the acceptance of a moment of ex nihilo creation that allows an opening for a true `theoretical materialism'.6 is not lacan's own conception of the passage a l'acte itself founded on such a kantian gesture? When lacan states that `suicide is the only successful act',7 the point is precisely this: after such an act, the subject will no longer be the same as before; she may be `reborn', but only as a new subject. Thus, kant concludes, if the expression `higher faculty of desire' is to be at all meaningful, it can be used only to indicate the fact that pure reason in itself is already practical. The higher faculty of desire, then, refers to the will of the subject as it is determined by `pure desire', a desire which does not aim at any particular object but, rather, at the very act of desiring - it refers to the faculty of desire as a priori.

### at: orient toward reform

# 1nr

### 2nc generic ov

#### C) reflects consensus of the lit.

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” [http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http:/polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf)

An examination of the scholarly literature on economic engagement as an instrument of statecraft reveals a striking pattern. Albert Hirschman’s 1945 study, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, is widely acknowledged today as a starting point for analysis (Hirschman, 1945/1980). Hirschman argued that the conscious cultivation of asymmetrical interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies to the preferences of the stronger state. He developed a systematic framework for analysis and applied it to the trading and political relationships between

### at: w/m -> trade

#### First, removing Cuba from the terror list at best means they’re effectually T and would not allow economic transactions, rather military ones

**Department of State No Date** (US department of state, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm)//HA

Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. Taken together, the four main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Designation under the above-referenced authorities also implicates other sanctions laws that penalize persons and countries engaging in certain trade with state sponsors. Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba March 1, 1982 Iran January 19, 1984 Sudan August 12, 1993 Syria December 29, 1979 For more details about State Sponsors of Terrorism, see "Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism" in Country Reports on Terrorism.

#### Military transactions are distinct from economic ones

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: **DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS** Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa **MILITARY CONTACTS** Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing **ECONOMIC CONTACTS** Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants **CULTURAL CONTACTS** Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Allowing effects topicality is a limits disaster on this topic – everything the US does effects the international economy

**Derrick, 98** - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. DERRICK United States Army (“ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695>)

In addition to the agencies that administer the programs listed in figure 3, the State Department proclaims that "...protecting national interests and advancing US goals involve virtually every agency of the government...."16 US governmental agencies with international reach directly engage as a part of their daily routines. Agencies that deal strictly with domestic policy indirectly engage through the effect their actions have on US markets and thus world markets. For example the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Transportation, and Energy, have both domestic and international responsibilities. From trade status to travel status, from immigration rules to export of tools, from training flights to basing rights, US agencies directly and indirectly engage through hundreds of programs. US governmental agencies that inadvertently operate at crosspurposes, through misunderstanding or ignorance, must ultimately be coordinated at some point. Since there is no single director below the President to coordinate the US engagement activities of the three elements of national power, it becomes the responsibility of the regional CINCs and Ambassadors.

#### They are mixing burdens --- trade expansion has to be the action of the plan, not the result of the plan

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows, “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations”.(p523-abstact).It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that “the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.”

#### The consensus of the literature is SO heavily in our favor its an easy neg ballot and the only standard for predictable evaluation

**Sheen, 2** – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” <http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf>) footnote 22

22 Speaking of different strategies of economic statecraft, Michael Mastanduno distinguishes: “Whereas economic warfare and a strategic embargo aim to weaken the capabilities (economic and/or military) of a target state and rely on either comprehensive or selective trade denial, linkage strategies are characterized by a reliance on some degree of trade expansion as a means to influence the behavior or policies of a target government.” In particular, he calls the unconditional positive engagement policy as a “structural linkage” strategy. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 53–58.

#### This means trade has to be the mechanism of the plan – engagement is a deliberate expansion of economic ties, not an effect

**KARAKASIS, 8** – MA in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Instabul Bilgi University (VASILEIOS, “THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON GREECE’S ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS TURKEY”, <http://www.academia.edu/667112/The_Impact_of_Europeanization_on_Greeces_Engagement_Strategy_towards_Turkey>)

This policy is accompanied by an economic pillar. By economic engagement what can be implied is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with the adversary aiming to change its attitude and improve the bilateral relations. This pillar relies on increasing levels of trade and investments aiming to moderate the target’s interests’ conceptions by shifting incentives and building networks of interdependence.48 Economic interdependence is able to operate as transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the latter. It can generate and establish vested interests in the context of target society and government undermining old values of military status and territorial acquisition. The beneficiaries of this interdependence become addicted to it and protect their interests by putting pressure on the government to accommodate the source of independence.49 Internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability might marginalize nationalist elites which are wedded to the threat or use of force. Regardless whether the society of targeted society constitutes a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to international economy become a critical part of the electorate to whom political elites must respond.50

### Case list

#### We allow a Cuba aff --- and it could be a T version of their aff, NTR is topical

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### Energy affs are topical and awesome.

Farnsworth, 13 --- vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (4/11/2013, Eric, “ENERGY SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

AND THE CARIBBEAN, HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-FarnsworthE-20130411.pdf>, JMP)

More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences ofregional energy development, including a lack of transparencyand official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education systemto develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and the rule of law.

### at: Reasonability